Abstract. We present a constant round protocol for Oblivious Transfer in Maurer's bounded storage model. In this model, a long random string R is initially transmitted and each of the parties interacts based on a small portion of R. Even though the portions stored by the honest parties are small, security is guaranteed against any malicious party that remembers almost all of the string R. Previous constructions for Oblivious Transfer in the bounded storage model required polynomially many rounds of interaction. Our protocol has only 5 messages. We also improve other parameters, such as the number of bits transferred and the probability of immaturely aborting the protocol due to failure. Our techniques utilize explicit constructions from the theory of derandomization. In particular, we use constructions of almost t-wise independent permutations, randomness extractors and averaging samplers.
Introduction
Oblivious transfer (OT) is one of the fundamental building blocks of modern cryptography. First introduced by Rabin [Rab81] , oblivious transfer can serve as a basis to a wide range of cryptographic tasks. Most notably, any multi-party secure computation can be based on the security of OT. This was shown for various models in several works (cf. [Yao86, GMW87, Kil88] ).
Oblivious transfer has been studied in several variants, all of which were eventually shown to be equivalent. In this paper we consider the one-out-of-two variant of OT by Even, Goldreich ad Lempel [EGL85] , which was shown to be equivalent to Rabin's variant by Crépeau [Cré87] .
One-out-of-two OT is a protocol between two players, Alice holding two secrets s 0 and s 1 , and Bob holding a choice bit c. At the end of the protocol Bob should learn the secret of his choice (i.e., s c ) but learn nothing about the other secret. Alice, on the other hand, should learn nothing about Bob's choice c.
Traditionally, constructions for OT have been based on strong computational assumptions. Either specific assumptions such as factoring or Diffie Hellman (cf. [Rab81, BM89, NP01]) or generic assumption such as the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations (cf. [EGL85, Gol03, GKM
+ 00]). In contrast, OT cannot be reduced in a black box manner to presumably weaker primitives such as one-way functions [IR89] .
This state of affairs motivates the construction of OT in other types of setups. Indeed, protocols for OT were suggested in different models such as under the existence of noisy channels [CK88] or quantum channels [BBCS92] . In this work we follow a direction initiated by Cachin, Crépeau and Marcil [CCM98] and construct OT in the Bounded Storage model.
The bounded storage model
In contrast to the usual approach in modern Cryptography, Maurer's bounded storage model [Mau92, Mau93] bounds the space (memory size) of dishonest players rather than their running time.
In a typical protocol in the bounded storage model a long random string R of length N is initially broadcast and the interaction between the polynomialtime participants is conducted based on a short portion of R.
5 What makes such protocols interesting is that, even though the honest players store only a small fraction k << N of the string R, security is guaranteed even against dishonest players with space K where k << K < N . Moreover, dishonest players are not restricted to be computationally bounded (This is formalized by allowing dishonest players to choose an arbitrary memory function g * : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} K , and store g * (R). From that moment on, they are not bounded in any way). Naturally, we'd like to maximize K and minimize k. In this paper we have K = νN for an arbitrary constant ν < 1 and k will be about K 1/2 . The bounded storage model has two appealing properties: (1) The security obtained is information theoretic and thus everlasting in the sense that security is guaranteed even if adversaries acquire infinite space after the protocol is executed. (2) Protocols in the bounded storage model need not rely on any assumption except the limitation on the storage capabilities of the adversary.
The latter property should be contrasted with traditional works in Cryptography in which, besides bounding the adversary's computational capabilities, it is also required to rely on unproven hardness assumptions (such as the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations, or the hardness of factoring large integers).
We mention that most of the previous work on the bounded storage model concentrated on private key encryption [Mau92, CM97, AR99, ADR02, DR02, DM02, Lu02, Vad03] and key agreement [Mau93, CM97] . 5 One possible implementation is that R is broadcast at a very high rate by a trusted party. Another possibility is to have R transmitted from a satellite. We remark that in our protocol (as in many previous ones) one of the parties can transmit these bits. Furthermore, the assumption that R is uniformly distributed can be relaxed and it is sufficient that R has high min-entropy.
Oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model
A protocol for OT in the bounded storage model was given in [CCM98] . This protocol requires k ≈ K 2/3 and allows K = νN for an arbitrary constant ν < 1. The error ǫ in this protocol is rather large ǫ = k −O(1) . (Loosely speaking the error ǫ measures the probability that a dishonest receiver with storage bound K learns both secrets.)
A modified protocol with smaller error ǫ and smaller space k was given in [Din01] . For every constant c > 0, it achieves k = K 1/2+c and ǫ = 2 −k c ′ where c ′ > 0 is a constant that depends on c. We mention that the security of [Din01] is proven in a slightly different (and weaker) model, where it is assumed that two random strings R 1 , R 2 of length 6K are transmitted one after the other and the bounded receiver chooses what to remember about R 2 as a function of what he remembers about R 1 . The work of [Din01] was subsequently extended to deal with one-out-of-k OT for any small constant k ≥ 2 in [HCR02] .
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All protocols mentioned above require a lot of interaction. Specifically, for ǫ = 2 −k O(1) , they require the exchange of k Ω(1) messages between the two players.
Our results
We give a constant round OT protocol in the bounded storage model. Our protocol uses 5 messages following the transmission of the random string R. We achieve parameters k and ǫ similar to that of [Din01] (that is, for every c > 0 there exist c ′ > 0 such that our protocol has k = K 1/2+c and ǫ = 2 −k c ′ ) while working in the stronger model of [CCM98] . Similar to [CCM98] we can achieve K = νN for an arbitrary constant ν < 1.
In addition to being constant round our protocol also achieves the following improvements over [CCM98, Din01] :
-The previous protocols are designed to transfer secrets in {0, 1}. Thus, transferring long secrets requires many messages. Our protocol can handle secrets of length k Ω(1) in one execution. -The previous protocols abort unsuccessfully with probability 1/2 even if both players are honest. Our protocol aborts only with probability 2
, the number of bits communicated in the two previous protocols is at least K 1/2 . In contrast, for error ǫ = 2
We also give a precise definition for the security of oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model, and point out difficulties arising when trying to consider the more standard notion of a "simulation based" definition.
Interactive Hashing
An important building block in the OT protocol is a construction of a constant round 2-to-1 interactive hashing protocol for unbounded parties. Loosely speaking, in such a protocol Bob holds an input W ∈ {0, 1} m , and Alice and Bob want to agree on a pair W 0 , W 1 such that W d = W for some d ∈ {0, 1}, yet Alice does not know d. It is also required that a dishonest Bob cannot "control" both W 0 and W 1 . (See Section 5 for a precise definition.)
As observed in [CCM98] , the protocol of Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [NOVY98] (originally used in the context of perfectly-hiding commitments) achieves 2-to-1 interactive hashing. One major drawback of the NOVY protocol, however, is that it requires m rounds of interaction. In this paper we give a new 4-message protocol for 2-to-1 interactive hashing that can be used to replace the NOVY protocol in the context of oblivious transfer in the bounded-storage model. Our protocol relies on a construction of almost t-wise independent permutations, such as the construction presented by Gowers in [Gow96] .
Organization. Due to space limitation, some of the details and proofs have been omitted from this version. In Section 2 we present an overview of the techniques that were utilized to achieve our results. Some preliminary definitions are given in Section 3. Section 4 provides a definition of OT in the bounded storage model. In Section 5 we define and state our theorem regarding interactive hashing. The OT protocol is presented in Section 6. Sections 7, 8 and 9 give a high level analysis of the protocol. Conclusions and open problems are in Section 10.
Overview of the technique
As motivation for our protocol, we begin by suggesting a simple protocol for OT in the bounded storage model which is bad in the sense that it requires large storage from the honest parties: Alice is required to store all of the string R and Bob is required to store half this string. We partition the N bit long string R into two equally long parts R 0 , R 1 of length N/2. Recall that Alice has two secrets s 0 , s 1 and Bob has a "choice bit" c and wants to obtain s c . Bob will choose which of the two parts R 0 , R 1 to store depending on his "choice bit" c.
Intuitively, even if Bob is dishonest and has storage bound νN then there is an I ∈ {0, 1} such that Bob "does not remember" (1 − ν)N/2 bits of information about R I . This can be formalized by saying that the conditional entropy of R I given the memory content of Bob is roughly (1 − ν)N/2. (Actually, in this paper, as in [CCM98, Din01] , we work with a variant of entropy called min-entropy).
Let Ext(X, Y ) (Ext for extractor) denote a function such that whenever X has sufficiently high min-entropy and Y is uniformly distributed then Ext(X, Y ) is close to being uniformly distributed. (The reader is referred to [Nis96, Sha02] for surveys on extractors). To complete the protocol, Alice sends Z i = s i ⊕ Ext(R i , Y i ) for both i = 0 and i = 1.
Note that an honest Bob can compute Ext(R c , Y c ) ⊕ Z c and obtain s c . However, if Bob is dishonest then Z I is close to uniform from Bob's point of view and reveals no information about s I .
7 It is easy to prove that even an unbounded dishonest Alice does not learn c.
Using a setup stage before the naïve protocol. The naïve protocol above requires very large storage bounds from the honest parties. In order to instantiate it in a more efficient manner we will first apply a carefully designed setup stage. Our goal is that at the end of the setup stage the two players will agree on two small subsets C 0 , C 1 ⊆ [N ] of size ℓ << N , such that Alice stores R 0 = R C0 and R 1 = R C1 . (We use R C to denote the |C| bit long string obtained by restricting R to the indices in C.) Bob remembers only one of R 0 , R 1 and cannot remember too much information about the other string. Furthermore, Alice does not know which of the two strings is not known to Bob. Following the setup stage, the two parties can perform OT by using the naïve protocol. We call this second stage the transfer stage. As the sets C 0 , C 1 are of size ℓ << N the storage required by the honest parties at the transfer stage is much smaller than before, and honest players can follow the naïve protocol with space O(ℓ) << N .
Implementing the setup stage. An implementation for such a setup stage was suggested in [CCM98] : Alice and Bob each choose a random subset of [N ] of size n = √ 2N ℓ. We denote them by A and B respectively. When the string R is transmitted Alice and Bob store R A and R B respectively. Alice then sends A to Bob. By the birthday paradox, with high probability C = A ∩ B is of size roughly ℓ. Note that Bob remembers R C , and Alice does not know C.
To complete the setup stage, Alice and Bob play an interactive hashing protocol with W = C. They obtain sets C 0 , C 1 ⊆ A such that C = C d for some d ∈ {0, 1} and such that Alice does not know d. The security requirement of the interactive hashing can be then used to guarantee that Bob "does not remember a lot of information" about one of the strings R C0 , R C1 . Thus, the two sets C 0 , C 1 satisfy the properties required above and the parties can complete the 7 We mention that the argument above is imprecise. Given the memory content of Bob, the strings Z0, Z1 are no longer independent. Thus, to prove security it is not sufficient to prove that ZI is uniformly distributed given the memory content of Bob.
In the technical proof we prove that ZI is uniformly distributed given the memory content of Bob, Z1−I and Y0, Y1.
A long random string R of length N is transmitted. OT protocol by using the naïve protocol.
8 Note that the setup stage requires the honest parties to store only k = n = √ N ℓ bits. In this presentation, we did not discuss the security of Bob, however it is easy to show that even an unbounded Alice, which remembers all of R, cannot learn any information about c.
Previous protocols. The protocols of [CCM98, Din01] both use the setup stage described above. They implement interactive hashing using the NOVY-protocol from [NOVY98] which takes ℓ = k Ω(1) -rounds. Following the setup stage they perform what can be seen in retrospect as variants of our naïve protocol. (Both papers do not use extractors explicitly, however their strategies can be viewed as some (weak) implementations of extractors.)
Our improvements. Our main improvement comes from replacing the NOVYprotocol for interactive hashing by a new 4-message protocol. This protocol is based on explicit constructions of almost t-wise independent permutations. Some of the additional improvements are given by using competitive explicit constructions of extractors for the naïve protocol above. Another source of improvement comes from allowing Alice to choose the set A using an averaging sampler (The reader is referred to [Gol97] for a survey on samplers). Choosing the set A using a competitive averaging sampler reduces the memory requirements of Alice and Bob, as well as the overall communication. 9 We remark that the usefulness of extractors in the bounded storage model was demonstrated in [Lu02] , and that of averaging samplers was demonstrated in [Vad03] .
10 Our paper can be seen as another example of the usefulness of ideas from the theory of derandomization when designing protocols for the bounded storage model.
The improved interactive hashing protocol
In an interactive hashing protocol Bob holds an input W ∈ {0, 1} m and at the end of the protocol both parties should agree on W 0 , W 1 . It is required that there is a d ∈ {0, 1} such that W = W d and that a dishonest Alice cannot learn d. The main requirement is that a dishonest Bob cannot "control" both W 0 , W 1 . This is captured by the following condition: For every strategy of Bob and every set S of size 2 s (where s is a parameter), If Alice is honest then with high probability Bob cannot force that both W 0 and W 1 are in S.
A naïve solution. A naïve solution to this problem is that Alice sends a random 2-to-1 "hash function" h : {0, with high probability over h there are
The NOVY-protocol. The NOVY-protocol [NOVY98] for interactive hashing can be thought of as a variant of the naïve solution described above in which Alice does not send "all" of the hash function at once. Alice chooses a random m × m matrix A with entries in {0, 1} subject to the restriction that A is invertible. Every such A can be seen as defining a function h A (x) = A · x. It is easy to see that the function h A is a pairwise independent permutation. In particular, the function h
..,m−1 is 2-to-1. The protocol consists of m − 1 rounds. In round i, Alice sends A i (the i'th row of A), and Bob replies with the z i = A i , W = h A (W ) i . Intuitively, revealing h A slowly in return to bits z i restricts Bob in the sense that he has to "choose at least part of his input" before seeing all of h A .
The new protocol. Viewing the NOVY-protocol this way suggests the following improvement: We replace the family {h A } A by a family of permutations with stronger independence properties. Namely, we will let π be randomly chosen from a family of m-wise independent permutations. In the new protocol, Alice sends π to Bob and in exchange Bob sends at once z 1 , · · · , z v where z i = π(W ) i for v close to m. We can show that the independence properties of π "protect Alice" and allow the parties to engage in a new interactive hashing protocol for sending the remaining few m − v bits. By choosing the parameters appropriately, the two parties can use the naïve solution (with a pairwise independent hash function g : {0, 1} m−v → {0, 1} m−v−1 ) after the first round. As a result of that we obtain a 2-round (4-messages) protocol (see Section 5.4).
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any explicit construction of a small sample space of t-wise independent permutations for t > 3. Nevertheless, in [Gow96] (see also [NR99] and the references therein) it was shown how to construct a sample space of permutations in which every t elements are close to being independent, and we can carry out the argument with this weaker property.
We use [N ] to denote the set {1, . . . , N }. We use X r ← S to denote uniformly choosing X from S. For a set A ⊆ [N ] and a string R ∈ {0, 1} N we let R A denote the substring of R consisting of the bits indexed by A. For a set S and ℓ ≤ |S|, we use S ℓ to denote the set of all subsets T ⊆ S with |T | = ℓ.
Encoding subsets. We use a method of encoding sets in
[n] ℓ into binary strings. The following method was used in [CCM98] :
For every integers ℓ ≤ n there is a one to one mapping F :
] such that both F and F −1 can be computed in time polynomial in n and space O(log n ℓ ).
Using Theorem 3.1 we can encode
by binary strings of length ⌈log n ℓ ⌉. However, it could be the case that images of subsets constitute only slightly more than half of the strings above. This is exactly what causes the protocols of [CCM98, Din01] to unsuccessfully abort with probability 1/2 (and is solved by repeating the protocol until the execution succeeds). Since in this work we are aiming for low round complexity, it would be beneficial to have the probability of unsuccessful abort to be significantly smaller than 1/2. To achieve this, we will use a more redundant encoding. This encoding is more "dense" than the original one and thus guarantees that most strings can be decoded. [n]
We now have the following Lemma (proof omitted). Min-entropy and Extractors. Min-entropy is a variant of Shannon's entropy that measures information on the worst case.
Definition 3.4 (Min-entropy) For a distribution X over a probability space Ω the min-entropy of X is defined by:
An extractor is a function that "extracts" randomness from arbitrary distributions which "contain" sufficient (min)-entropy [NZ96] .
We remark that a regular (non-strong) extractor is defined in a similar way, replacing the random variable (Ext(X, Y ), Y ) by Ext(X, Y ).
Averaging Samplers and Min-Entropy Samplers. A fundamental lemma by Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96] asserts that given a δv-source X on {0, 1} v , with high probability over choosing T ⊆ [v] of size t, X T is roughly a δt-source.
In [CCM98] this lemma is used to assert that if a bounded storage adversary has memory bound νv for ν ≈ 1 − δ then for a random T he "remembers at most νt bits about X T ". This approach is also used in [Vad03] which constructs private key encryption in the bounded storage model. As shown in [RSW00, Vad03] the lemma does not require a uniformly chosen subset. It is sufficient that T is chosen using a "good averaging sampler" 11 (such samplers have been a subject of a line of studies starting with [BR94] , see survey of [Gol97] ).
Definition 3.7 (Averaging sampler)
The function Samp is said to have distinct samples if for every p ∈ [L], the t outputs of Samp(p) are distinct.
A min-entropy sampler has the property that for most choices of p, the variable X Samp(p) is close to having high min-entropy. As shown in [Vad03] , every averaging sampler yields a min-entropy sampler.
t be a (µ, θ, γ)-averaging sampler with distinct samples for µ = (δ − 2τ )/ log(1/τ ) and θ = τ / log(1/τ ). Then there is a constant c > 0 such that for every 0 < α < 1, Samp is a
We now turn to formally define oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model. The following definitions characterize malicious strategies for Alice and Bob. Note that in the definitions below the malicious strategies are asymmetric. We restrict malicious strategies for Bob to have bounded storage while no bounds are placed on malicious strategies for Alice. Clearly, if a protocol is secure against unbounded strategies for Alice, it is also secure against bounded strategies. Thus, the security defined here is even stronger than that explained in the introduction. 
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The following definition captures a bounded storage strategy with storage bound K. Loosely speaking, the only restriction made on a bounded storage strategy B * is that it has some memory function g * : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} K and its actions depend on R only through g * (R). This formally captures that B * remembers only K bits about R. The security of Alice asks that following the setup stage (which does not depend on the secrets), there is an index C (possibly a random variable which depends on R and the messages sent by the two parties in the setup stage) such that Bob's view is (close to) identically distributed for every two C-consistent pairs. In other words, Bob's view is (almost) independent of one of the secrets (defined by 1 − C). We next present the actual definition.
Definition 4.4 (Oblivious Transfer
u , Bob inputs a choice bit c ∈ {0, 1}, and that satisfies:
Functionality : If Alice and Bob follow the protocol then for any s 0 , s 1 and c, 1. The protocol does not abort with probability 1 − ǫ.
2. If the protocol ends then Bob outputs s c , whereas Alice outputs nothing.
Security for Bob: The view of any strategy A * is independent of c. Namely, for every s 0 , s 1 :
(K, ǫ)-Security for Alice: for every bounded storage strategy B * for Bob with memory bound K and input c there is a random variable C defined by the end of the setup stage such that for every two pairss ands ′ that are C-consistent:
If Bob is semi-honest then C = c, 13 however, a dishonest receiver can always choose to ignore c and play with an input c ′ which depends on R and the messages in the setup stage. Thus, letting C depend on R and the messages in the setup stage is unavoidable. We remark that the definition would be meaningless if C was allowed to depend on the secrets s 0 , s 1 , and this is the reason we require a partitioning of a protocol into a setup stage and transfer stage. We stress that the security achieved in this definition is information theoretic.
Remark. We mention that it does not immediately follow that all the "standard" applications of OT can be performed in the bounded storage model (this is also the case for the previous protocols in this model [CCM98, Din01] ). Nevertheless, we now explain how this protocol can be used as a sub-protocol to perform other cryptographic tasks. For this we note that the above definition implies security by a simulation argument (although the simulator is not necessarily efficient).
14 13 A semi-honest receiver is one that follows the protocol but remembers more than required about R and attempts to use this information to learn both secrets. 14 Loosely speaking, the simulation paradigm requires that any attack of a malicious party can be simulated in an ideal setting where the parties interact only through a trusted party. This insures that the protocol is as secure as an interaction in the ideal setting.
Thus, for example, our OT protocol can be used as in the construction of Kilian [Kil88] , to give a protocol for secure two-party computation in the bounded storage model. The security achieved guarantees that an unbounded party learns nothing about the input of the other party. We stress that typically one requires that the simulators should run with essentially the same efficiency as the attack being simulated, and that this provides a stronger notion of security. We now give a sketch of the simulator for the receiver's strategy B * . The simulator plays the roles of both B * and A in the protocol up to the transfer stage. At this point the simulator computes the random variable C and calls the trusted party asking for secret C. It continues by simulating A with inputs s C as received from the trusted party and a random s 1−C . By the definition this turns out to be a valid simulation, however, computing C is not necessarily efficient and therefore the simulation is unbounded.
Interactive Hashing
One of the main tools we use in this paper is the interactive hashing protocol. While useful in the bounded storage model, it is important to note that interactive hashing is not necessarily related to this model. As a matter of fact, the definitions and protocols given here achieve security against all powerful adversaries with no storage bounds at all.
Preliminaries: Permutations and Hash Functions
Definition 5.1 (2 k -to-1 Hash Functions) A hash function h : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m−k is 2 k -to-1 if for every output of h there are exactly 2 k pre-images. That is, |h −1 (z)}| = 2 k for every z ∈ {0, 1} m−k .
One simple method of constructing a 2 k -to-1 hash function is to take a permutation on m-bit strings and omit the last k bits of its output. Clearly every output of the resulting function can be extended to 2 k different strings and therefore has 2 k pre-images. Examples of useful permutations follow.
Almost t-wise Independent Permutations. In our discussion we would like to use a random permutation on m bit strings. However, a description of such a permutation would be exponentially long since there are (2 m )! such permutations. The solution is to use a permutation that falls short of being truly random but still has enough randomness to it. Specifically we want to efficiently sample a permutation π out of a small space of permutations such that when looking at π applied on any t points in {0, 1} m then π behaves like a truly random permutation. Such a space is called a t-wise independent permutation space.
Unlike in the case of functions, where there are extremely randomness efficient constructions of t-wise independent functions, we are unaware of such constructions for permutations. Instead we further relax our demands and ask the construction to be almost t-wise independent, that is, the distribution induced by the permutation π on any t points is statistically close to the distribution induced on these points by a truly random permutation. Formally: Definition 5.2 An η-almost t-wise independent permutation space is a procedure that takes as input a seed of l bits and outputs a description of an efficiently computable permutation in S 2 m .
15 A uniformly chosen seed induces a distribution Π t,η on permutations such that for any t strings x 1 , . . . x t ∈ {0, 1} m :
We use the construction presented by Gowers in [Gow96] .
Theorem 5.3 ([Gow96])
There exists an η-almost t-wise independent permutation space Π t,η with t = m, η = 1 2 m t and seed length l = m C for some constant C. Furthermore, Π t,η runs in time and space polynomial in the seed length.
We note that the main Theorem of Gowers requires some special properties from the value of m. However, this is only needed to improve parameters, and the weaker results presented in the middle of the paper (Lemma 3) are satisfactory and put no limitation on the value of m. The constant in the exponent of the above Theorem is around C = 10, which is high but acceptable.
Other constructions of almost t-wise independent permutations were discussed in [NR99] and other references therein.
Pairwise Independent Permutations. A widely used tool is a pairwise independent permutation of strings of m bits. This is simply a 2-wise independent permutation as defined above (i.e., a 0-almost 2-wise independent permutation).
The construction that we use identifies {0, 1} m with the field GF (2 m ). A permutation is sampled by randomly choosing two elements a, b ∈ GF (2 m ) with the restriction that a = 0. The permutation is then defined by g a,b (x) = ax+b (where all operations are in the field). Generating a pairwise independent permutation therefore requires 2m random bits.
Note: To construct a pairwise independent 2-to-1 hash function simply take a pairwise independent permutation and omit the last bit of its output.
Definition: Interactive Hashing
Interactive hashing is a protocol between Alice with no input and Bob with an input string. At the end of the protocol Alice and Bob should agree on two strings: One should be Bob's input and intuitively the other should be random. Moreover, Alice should not be able to distinguish which of the two is Bob's input and which is the random string. 
Let d ∈ {0, 1} be such that W d = W . Furthermore, if the distribution of the string W 1−d over the randomness of the two parties is η-close to uniform, then the protocol is called η-uniform interactive hashing (or simply uniform interactive hashing if η = 0). 
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of A and B
* . An interactive hashing protocol is (s, ρ)-secure if it is secure for B and (s, ρ)-secure for A.
Remark. The definition above does not deal with the case that dishonest players abort before the end of the execution. Intuitively, such a definition is sufficient for our purposes since in our OT protocol, the interactive hashing is used before the players send any message that depends on their secrets, and thus their secrets are not compromised.
Partial Result: A Two Message Interactive Hashing
We start by showing that when the bad set S is small enough then the following naïve protocol is sufficiently good. In this 2 message protocol called 2M-IH, Alice sends a random 2-to-1 hash function h : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m−1 and Bob replies with z = h(W ).
Claim 5.6 For all u, the 2M-IH protocol is a (s, 2 −(m−2s+1) )-secure uniform interactive hashing.
Proof: The 2M-IH is clearly an interactive hashing protocol, and since h is pairwise independent, then it is also uniform (W 1−d is uniformly distributed). The 2M-IH is also secure for B since all that Bob sends to Alice is h(W ), which is the exact same view whether Bob has input W = W 1 or W = W 0 . On the other hand, since h is a pairwise independent hash function, then the probability over the choice of h for any two strings W 0 , W 1 to be mapped to a certain cell z ∈ {0, 1} m−1 is perfectly random, that is:
Denote X z = 1 if both strings mapped to cell z are from the set S and X z = 0 otherwise. Then:
Denote by X the number of cells z such that both values mapped into z are from the set S, then:
The protocol is insecure only if Bob finds a cell z with two bad values, that is only if X ≥ 1. But using Markov's inequality we have that Pr
. Thus this protocol is (s, 2 −(m−2s+1) )-secure for Alice.
A Four Message Protocol for Interactive Hashing
The two message protocol is useful when the bad set S is very small. However, if S is large (for example, if |S| = 2 s and s = γm for any constant γ) then this protocol does not suffice. While the interactive hashing protocol of [NOVY98] takes m round of communication to overcome this, the following protocol achieves this using an interaction of just four messages. defined as:
where π(x)i denotes the i th bit of π(x). Input of Alice: ⊥. Input of Bob: W ∈ {0, 1} m .
-Alice: Choose π r ← Π. Send π to Bob. Proof: We start by noting that the protocol is efficient for both parties due to the efficiency of the permutations used. Furthermore, they can run in small space. This is an η-uniform interactive hashing protocol since h is η close to pairwise independent and therefore the distribution of W 1−d is η close to uniform. The 4M-IH protocol is secure for B since no matter what strategy A * Alice uses, the messages that Bob sends are identical whether his input is
This protocol has two stages of question and answer (4 messages), and in order to prove the security for A we view each of these two parts separately. In the first part, all strings W ∈ {0, 1} m are divided by π ′ into 2 v cells (according to the value of π ′ (W )). Our goal is to show that no cell z ′ ∈ {0, 1} v has too many strings from the bad set S mapped to it. The second part of the protocol can then be viewed as implementing the 2M-IH protocol on strings in the cell z ′ , yielding the security of the combined protocol (the portion of bad strings in the cell z ′ is reduced to less than a square root of the strings in the cell). We start by bounding the probability that a specific set of t strings are mapped by π ′ to the same cell z.
Claim 5.8 For every z ∈ {0, 1} v and all x 1 , . . . , x t ∈ {0, 1} m we have that:
Proof: Suppose that π was a t-wise independent function (and not permutation), then for every x i ∈ {0, 1} m we have that the probability that π ′ (x i ) = z is exactly 1 2 v and the probability that this is the case for t different values is exactly 1 2 v t . But since π is a permutation, this probability is smaller since for
But π is actually an almost t-wise independent permutation, the probability on t elements may deviate by be up to η from the truly random permutation and therefore ρ ≤ 1 2 v t + η Let us focus on a specific cell z ∈ {0, 1} v . For every set of t elements x 1 , . . . , x t ∈ S denote the Y π z (x 1 , . . . , x t ) the indicator if all x i is mapped to z or not. That is:
Let Y π z denote the number of strings from S mapped to cell z by π ′ . Let E = 2 s 2 v , which is the expected number of strings from S in each cell, if they were divided uniformly at random. We claim that with high probability, Y π z does not deviate much from E.
Our BS-OT protocol is presented in figure 4 . The protocol relies on three ingredients: An extractor, a min-entropy sampler, and an interactive hashing protocol. The precise requirements from the ingredients are presented in figure 5.
Input of Alice: Secret bits s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1} u . Input of Bob: Choice bit c ∈ {0, 1}. Setup Stage:
Subsets Stage: Alice and Bob store subsets of the string R ∈ {0, 1} N .
-Alice: Choose P In our suggested implementation of BS-OT we choose Samp A to be the sampler from [Vad03] , Ext to be an extractor from [RRV99] and use the 4M − IH interactive hashing protocol from the previous section. The precise choices of parameters for these ingredients appear in Section 8. These choices meet the requirements of figure 5 with ǫ = 2
−Ω(ℓ) .The main theorem of this paper asserts that this implementation of BS-OT is a constant round protocol for oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model.
At first reading, the reader may safely ignore the sampler and assume that the set A is chosen uniformly at random. That is assume that Samp A is the identity mapping on [N ] n .
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16 Using different samplers allows choosing a "random" set A which has a shorter description. Specifically, using the sampler from Section 8 reduces the description size of A from log N n = Θ(n log n) to O(ℓ).
Parameters: -N -the length of the long random string R.
-n -the number of bits honest players remember about R.
-u -the length of the secrets.
-ℓ = n 2 /2N -the size of the intersection set. -ν -the dishonest receiver remembers at most νN bits about R.
-ǫ -the error of the protocol. We can only achieve ǫ ≥ 2
A is defined below and c > 0 is some constant which may depend on the constant cIH defined below. We therefore require that ǫ satisfy this condition. n with:
• φA ≤ ǫ/20.
• ǫA ≤ ǫ/20.
• LA determines the length of the first message sent by Alice.
−m )-uniform interactive hashing protocol for strings of length m = 10ℓ log n with:
is a constant chosen in the proof).
• ρ ≤ ǫ/20. ⋆ ⋆ Note that ρ depends on cIH and this is why we allow the constant c in the requirement on ǫ to depend on cIH . The order of quantifiers is as follows: There is some constant cIH > 0 chosen in the proof. The constant c depends on this constant. Theorem 6.1 There is a constant α > 0 such that if N, n and ℓ satisfy log n ≤ ℓ ≤ n α then for every constant ν < 1 let protocol BS-OT use the ingredients described in Section 8. Protocol BS-OT is a (1 − ǫ)-oblivious transfer protocol for ǫ = 2
−Ω(ℓ) . Furthermore:
-The protocol has 5 messages.
-The strategies for Alice and Bob runs in time poly(n) and space k = O(n log n).
-The protocol passes secrets of length u = Ω(ℓ).
-The overall number of bits exchanged is
The constants hidden in ǫ, s, u and T C above depend on ν.
17
17 Tracing this dependency gives that for δ = (1 − ν): ǫ = 2 −Ω(δℓ/ log(1/δ)) , s = m − O(δℓ/ log(1/δ)), and u = Ω(δℓ). This holds even when ν isn't a constant as long as n ≥ ℓ/δ 4 . That is, the Theorem holds even for ν ≈ 1 − (ℓ/n) 4 .
The results mentioned in the introduction can be obtained by choosing n = N 1/2+a / log N for some small constant a > 0. Note that if a is sufficiently small then the space of honest players satisfies k = O(n log n)
), where the last inequality follows assuming ν > 1/2 which we can assume w.l.o.g. As ℓ = n 2 /2N we have that ℓ = n 2a /2 log N ≥ k a for large enough n, and we have that ǫ = 2
−Ω(ℓ) = 2
−Ω(k a ) .
The Functionality and Security of the OT Protocol
The proof of Theorem 6.1 follows from the combination of several lemmas stated below. The first Lemma asserts that protocol BS-OT indeed implements oblivious transfer. Proof: We first show that with high probability |A ∩ B| ≥ ℓ. This is because for every fixed A, as B is a random set the expected size of A ∩ B is n 2 /N ≥ 2ℓ. A standard Lemma (see for example Corollary 3 in [Din01] ) can be used to show that there exists a constant 0 < d < 1 such that probability that |A ∩ B| < ℓ is at most 2e −dℓ . We now show that the probability that one of W 0 , W 1 is not a valid encoding of a subset is small. W d was chosen by Bob and is certainly a valid encoding. By the definition of Interactive Hashing, the other string W 1−d is η-close to uniformly distributed in {0, 1} m , for η < 2 −m . By Lemma 3.3 the probability that a random string W ∈ {0, 1} m is not a valid encoding is at most n ℓ 2 −m ≤ 2 ℓ log n−m ≤ 2 −ℓ−1 as m = 10ℓ log n. It follows that the probability of abort is bounded by 2 −m + 2 −ℓ−1 ≤ 2 −ℓ . To see that whenever the protocol does not abort Bob indeed outputs s c , we observe that X = R C is known to Bob (since C = A ∩ B ⊆ B and Bob has stored all the bits R B ). In particular, Bob is always able to compute E(X, Y c⊕e ) and subsequently use it in order to "decrypt" the value Z c⊕e . By the definition of the protocol we then have:
= s c where Eq. (1) follows from the fact that X d equals R C (= X), which in turns follows from the fact that C d = C (since W d = W and the encoding F m is one-to-one). The lemma follows.
Theorem 7.2 For every choice of ingredients of BS-OT, the protocol is secure for Bob.
Proof: We show that for any strategy A * , the view of A * is independent of the bit c. This is shown by the following argument: Fix the randomness of A * and R. We show a perfect bijection between possible pairs of B's randomness r B and input c. That is, for each pair (r B , c) that is consistent with the view V of A * , there exists a unique pair (r The following theorem (which is technically the most challenging theorem of this paper) guarantees Alice's security against bounded storage receivers. This theorem refers to a list of requirements on the parameters of the ingredients which appears in figure 5. The proof of this theorem is long and technical and appears in the full version of this paper. Section 9 is dedicated to giving an outline of this proof. As we show in section 8, Ext and Samp A and 4M−IH satisfy all the requirements in figure 5 for ǫ = 2
−Ω(ℓ) . Theorem 7.3 thus implies the following corollary.
Corollary 7.4 Let Ext, Samp A and IH be chosen as in Theorem 6.1. Protocol BS-OT is (νN, ǫ)-secure for Alice, for ǫ = 2 −aℓ where a > 0 is a constant that depends on ν.
Lemma 7.5 Let Ext, Samp A and IH be chosen as in Theorem 6.1. The statements in the itemized list in Theorem 6.1 hold.
Proof: It is easy to verify that the protocol has 5 messages (not including the transmission of R). By section 8 the extractor and sampler run in time polynomial in n and space ℓ O(1) + O(n). Protocol 4M-IH runs in time and space polynomial in m = 10ℓ log n. Thus, both parties run in time polynomial in n. Both parties require space n to store R A and R B and space m O(1) to play 4M-IH. Alice's set A is chosen by a sampler with log L A = O(ℓ), thus it can be stored in space O(ℓ). Overall, Alice's space is bounded by O(n) + poly(ℓ). Bob's set B is a random set, and thus takes O(n log n) bits to store. We conclude that both players can run their strategies in space O(n log n) + poly(ℓ) which is bounded by O(n) for sufficiently small α as required. The protocol passes secrets of length m E where m E = Ω(ℓ). Finally, the longest message sent in the protocol is the description of the permutation π in the interactive which is of length at most ℓ O(1) .
Choosing the ingredients
We now turn to choose the ingredients for BS-OT to get the parameters guaranteed in Theorem 6.1. Given n, N, u, ν, we shoot for ǫ = 2 −Ω(ℓ) . We need to show an extractor and sampler that satisfy the conditions specified in figure 5 .
The extractor. In [RRV99] it was shown how to construct a (k E , ǫ E )-strong extractor, Ext : {0, 1} ℓ × {0, 1} dE → {0, 1} u , for every k E , u = k E − 2 log(1/ǫ E ) − O(1) and d E = c log(1/ǫ E ) for some constant c as long as log(1/ǫ) > log 4 ℓ. Setting k E = δ ′ A ℓ/6, we can get u = δ t with distinct samples for every µ > θ > 0 and γ > 0 as long as t ≥ Ω(log(1/γ)/θ 2 ). This sampler has log L ≤ log(v/t) + log(1/γ)(1/θ) O(1) . By Lemma 3.9, for every δ, γ such that log(1/γ)/δ 4 ≤ n this sampler yields a (δ, δ/2, (γ + 2
−Ω(δn) ) 1/2 , (γ + 2 −Ω(δn) ) 1/2 )-min-entropy sampler
n . Setting γ = 2 −ℓ we have that as long as n ≥ ℓ/δ 4 this sampler has φ = ǫ = 2
−Ω(δℓ)) , and log L A ≤ log n + ℓ(1/δ) O(1) . Note that the condition n ≥ ℓ/δ 4 is satisfied when ν is a constant (as in this case δ = δ A is also a constant). 18 We also note that the above sampler can be computed in time polynomial in n and space O(n).
The interactive hashing protocol. We need to show that protocol 4M-IH satisfies the requirements of figure 5. It is required there that 4M-IH is (s, 2 −Ω(δ as m = 10ℓ log n and ℓ ≥ log n. When ν is a constant, δ ′ A is also a constant and we have that ρ = 2
−Ω(ℓ) as required. We note that Protocol 4M-IH requires requires time and space polynomial in ℓ. 18 We remark that we don't have to require that ν is a constant. Our protocol also works for ν = 1 − o(1) as long as the condition above (n ≥ ℓ/δ 4 ) is satisfied.
Theorem 7.3 regarding Alice's security is somewhat technical and involves many parameters. Due to lack of space, we will only give a sketch of the proof while ignoring the precise parameters. Fix some bounded storage strategy B * with storage bound νN for some ν < 1, and an input c. We need to show that there exists a random variable C determined in the setup stage such that for every two pairs of secrets s, s ′ which are C-consistent the view of B * is distributed roughly the same way no matter whether Alice's input is s or s ′ . Recall that in the protocol, the secrets s 0 , s 1 are only involved in the transfer stage where z i = Ext(X i , Y i ) ⊕ s i for i ∈ {0, 1}. Our goal is to show that there exists a random variable I determined in the setup stage such that for every choice of secrets s 0 , s 1 , the string Z I is close to uniformly distributed from B * 's point of view. More precisely, for every i ∈ {0, 1} we split Alice's messages into Z i and all the rest of the messages which we denote by M SG i . For every fixing of r of R and msg i of M SG i , B * 's point of view on Z i is captured by considering the distribution Z ′ i = (Z i |g * (R) = g * (r), M SG i = msg i ). We show that for most fixings r and msg I , the random variable Z
